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In May 2016, the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) held a two day public workshop to solicit input and obtain background 
information for the formulation of a future regulatory change to 49 CFR part 193, Liquefied 
Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards. Representatives from the public, industry, and 
governmental agencies were offered an opportunity to participate in a future rule making by 
providing their desired changes to Part 193.  Part 193 was promulgated in 1980 and the last major 
revision was in 2000 when requirements were removed from Part 193 and replaced by 
incorporating additional requirements from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 59A, 
Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). This paper 
serves to report the major outcomes of the workshop and outline some of the challenges that are 
present in updating the regulation.  This paper in no way represents a definitive path forward for 
Part 193 and is not an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.  The discussion contained in this 




The LNG industry is nearly 60 years old.  During the industry’s first expansion in the United States 
it became obvious that consistent, national regulation was needed. In 1972 the Department of 
Transportation amended Part 192 to create § 192.12 to establish Federal safety standards for 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). The 1971 edition of NFPA 59A was incorporated by reference as an 
interim measure while permanent regulations were being developed. Part 193 was promulgated in 
1980 as required by the Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 and as re-codified in 49 United States Code 
Section 60103.  PHMSA must periodically issue updates to standards incorporated by reference 
(IBR). PHMSA assess the impact of new editions to public and the environment. When revised 
safety standards are clearly an improvement to the public, the environment, and pipeline safety, 
the new addition is adopted. In  2000 Part 193 Subparts on siting, design, construction, equipment, 
and fire protection were largely removed and instead referenced chapters 1 through 9 of NFPA 
59A (1996 edition).  Until then, Part 193 referenced NFPA 59A in only a few instances concerning 
 
 
siting, design, and fire protection.  In 2009, PHMSA reviewed NFPA 59A’s 2006 edition, but 
noted that the recent revisions to NFPA 59A lacked sufficient justification and did not address 
several of PHMSA’s concerns.  At the time of the 2010 periodic update, PHMSA only adopted 
specific sections on seismic design of LNG storage tanks and certain nondestructive test 
requirements from the 2009 version of 59A. In the 2010 IBR final rule, PHMSA stated that it, 
“believes that the NFPA 59A committee has yet to reconcile issues relating to dispersion analyses 
for vapor releases from process and safety equipment; containers with liquid penetrations at grade; 
design spill cases for full and double containment containers; standards for impoundment sizing 
for snow accumulation, severe weather, emergency depressurization, and fuel bunkering”. While 
there have been 25 amendments to the regulation, other than the 2000 rule, most changes have 
been procedural.  In contrast, NFPA 59A has published revision in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016. 
These newer editions include new technologies (e.g. membrane tanks, vacuum jacketed pipe), 
incorporate additional safety standards, adopt more current version of standards incorporated by 
reference, provide for a method to approve radiant heat flux models, and add risk based siting. 
Other changes were made to address the new use of LNG as fuel and for marine export facilities. 
The prevailing perception of the industry and public is that PHMSA’s regulations are lagging 
behind an industry that is rapidly evolving. 
 
To address this shortcoming, PHMSA is developing a proposed rulemaking.  This began with 
investigation into the shortcomings of the current code to better understand where changes may be 
necessary.  A significant effort to evaluate NFPA 59A-2016 for IBR is underway.  
 
As part of these efforts, a public workshop was organized to discuss some of the major issues 
surrounding the LNG industry today.  PHMSA maintains that early and continuous public 
involvement brings a broad range of viewpoints into the decision-making process. This process 
enables PHMSA to make better informed decisions through collaborative efforts and builds mutual 
understanding. The workshop featured 23 speakers, covering a variety of topics from siting and 
design to emergency response.   A question and answer session followed each day’s presentations 
The May workshop attracted approximately 160 people in Washington, DC.  Another 200 joined 
via the simultaneous webcast.  Audience members included stakeholder representatives from the 
LNG, rail and maritime industry, associations, technical committees, engineering consultants, risk 
& safety management, the public, emergency responders, laboratories, manufacturers, law firms, 
insurance companies, and state, federal, and foreign governmental agencies.  This effort was 
initiated in order to open a public dialogue about some of the shortcomings of Part 193 and lead 
to a proposal for an appropriate set of changes in the future. Workshop details are available at 
PHMSA’s web site (http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/MtgHome.mtg?mtg=111) and as a 
recorded video feed on YouTube.  A Federal docket was made available for this workshop and 
remains open for any interested party to provide comments. (Docket PHMSA–2016–0005, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/04/26/2016-09653/pipeline-safety-public-




Alan Mayberry, Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, kicked off the workshop.  Mr. 
Mayberry established the goals of the workshop – to listen to stakeholders, to collect public input 
as a catalyst for revising and updating Part 193, and to communicate the path forward to adapt the 
 
 
code to address new technologies and scale of the LNG industry.  He emphasized how the 
underlying principles of Part 193 are to understand and manage risk. He stated that code 
requirements are the minimum bar and industry should seek continual movement toward improved 
safety performance.  His presentation tied into PHMSA’s mission to protect people and the 
environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous materials that are 
essential to our daily lives and its vision to be the most innovative safety transportation 
organization in the world.  DOT’s introduction was wrapped up by Kenneth Lee, Director of the 
Engineering & Research Division, Office of Pipeline Safety.  Mr. Lee described the ongoing 
research projects conducted by DOT, including work to better define equipment failure rates for 
LNG plants and a project to expand the understanding of vapor dispersion and radiant heat flux 
exclusion zone calculations. The first day various stakeholders provided their perspectives.  The 
following are highlights from stakeholder group presentations: 
 
Governmental Agencies  
 
 The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS) regulates transportation of LNG in 
commerce but does not regulate the transport of LNG used as fuel.  (Air transportation of 
LNG is prohibited.)  DOT is working in collaboration with the Federal Railway 
Administration to establish a baseline bulk tank car and locomotive tender design standard 
for LNG.  While transport of LNG by rail tank car is currently prohibited, portable tanks 
and cargo tanks are authorized on a rail car with approval from Federal Railroad 
Administration. There are approximately 28,000 LNG tank (truck) trailers are in service. 
Within this fleet, there have been 10 highway incidents over last 15 years with no fires or 
explosions.  Transport of LNG above deck on a cargo vessel, or a passenger-carrying vessel 
is also permitted with a restriction on the number of passengers, depending on vessel 
length, and stowage must be clear of living quarters. 
 OHMS is researching LNG product flows to understand future LNG transportation needs, 
as well as continuing research with the FRA for portable LNG containers and rail cars. 
 PHMSA presented the definitions and criteria for incident reporting at LNG plants. Since 
LNG incident reporting began on January 1, 2011, there have been nine reported LNG 
incidents with one on-site fatality and one on-site injury.  Failure causes include inadequate 
purging and equipment/material failure. The service age of currently regulated LNG plants 
was also reviewed.  The percentages of LNG facilities entering service by decade was 
found to be: 
o 10% 1960-69 
o 61% 1970-79 
o   4% 1980-89 
o 10% 1990-99 
o 10% 2000-09 
o   4% 2010-2016 
 A State pipeline inspector provided a detailed presentation covering the safety aspects of 
inspection of LNG Facilities. Inspectors review O&M procedures, maintenance schedules, 
equipment control panels for sieves and compressors, relief valve inspections, and review 
upgrades, among many other inspection duties. 
 The Gas Technology Institute (GTI) presented on behalf of the emergency responder 
community. They emphasized the importance of training all stakeholders and provided 
 
 
sources for training guidance. GTI supports the LNG industry through training classes for 
LNG hazards and emergency response. They highlighted the need for regulations to keep 
up with industry practices. 
 
The LNG Industry 
 
 Large Scale Operator – Cheniere’s Sabine Pass LNG was the first U.S. LNG export facility 
since Kenai LNG opened in 1969. They provided an overview of the growing and maturing 
LNG industry. Older versions of standards referenced in the regulation negatively impact 
design, construction and operations. Ultimately, LNG regulations should reflect industry 
best practice and a risk based approach. 
 Mid-scale Operator – The proposed Tacoma LNG project will combine peak-shaving and 
marine bunkering to serve an LNG powered container ships. They highlighted some 
challenges of the regulatory environment including obtaining over 16 federal and state 
approvals. Some of the agencies require different versions of the same code. They site is a 
prime industrial waterfront property and a relatively populated environment. They 
emphasized the importance of relationships between industry, regulators and the public. 
 GTT – Membrane LNG storage tank technology is permissible in NFPA 59A 2016. 
Membrane tanks are pose similar risk as 9% Ni tanks. They have been used on ships for 
over 40 years.  They provide cost advantages over concrete and nickel steel tanks. 
 Braemar Engineering – Various tank and containment types were covered. The 
presentation covered previous issues PHMSA had identified with full containment concrete 
tanks and the newly incorporated standard, ACI 376, for concrete tanks.  
 Chart Technology covered modular cryogenic systems for smaller-scale operations. They 
discussed the issues surrounding complying with ASME BPVC 1992 edition allowable 
stress and test pressure requirements. Cold stretching is permitted with the latest edition of 
ASME BPVC but PHMSA has not adopted it yet. They also discussed work performed by 




 NFPA 59A Committee – A historical overview of the NFPA 59A standard was given, with 
emphasis on the potions of the standard that have changed since the 2001 version.  The 
59A committee has been more active in recent years to maintain a good working 
relationship with PHMSA, and hopes that one of the recent or forthcoming versions of 59A 
can be incorporated by reference into Part 193. The public input comment period closes in 
January, 2017. 
 AGA explained how the LNG industry has an excellent safety record partly due to the 
codes and standards that are part of the industry. The presentation explored the issue of 
managing aging LNG plants and the importance of operational and maintenance data. 







 A presentation from a board member of the Pipeline Safety Trust detailed the various ways 
LNG plant siting could be done, including prescriptive, performance, and “other” methods, 
which may include insurance requirements or public planning.  An emphasis was made on 
the importance of public involvement in LNG plant planning, including through standards 
organizations, regulatory hearings, and public partnering programs. The current LNG 
siting is based on precautionary measures using worst-case scenarios, but does not allow 
for public participation. 
 Several members of the public were in attendance and actively asked questions of the 
presenters. 
 
The second day addressed hazards at LNG facilities including a presentation on an LNG accident 
and emergency response, vapor cloud explosions, consequence modeling, risk base siting, and 
process safety management. The following are highlights from the second day’s presentations.  
 
LNG Incident and Response  
 
 The Williams Plymouth LNG Plant in Washington State is a 1970s era peakshaver. An 
incident occurred in 2014.  They presented information about the incident investigation 
and evidence preservation. 
 The incident involved a vessel failure during plant startup.  The root cause was described 
as: “The lack of a complete purge left an air and natural gas mixture in plant piping 
downstream of the adsorber towers.  During startup the flammable mixture was pulled into 
the salt bath purification heater where it then ignited, creating a rolling detonation back 
through the purification piping until it reached adsorber D-20A which then failed, 
dissipating the energy of the rolling detonation.” 
 The explosion caused significant local damage, as well as sending projectiles several 
hundred feet.  Five plant personnel suffered minor (non-reportable) injuries. 
 A projectile penetrated to the outer shell of one LNG storage tank and dented the inner 
tank.   Cold natural gas and perlite insulation were released. 
 A projectile damaged a small fitting on an LNG line, resulting in a small LNG release; 
other shrapnel caused gas releases at several locations. 
 One projectile damaged a rail line offsite; no other significant offsite impacts were realized. 
 The explosion damaged the electronic safety systems. The process systems had to be 
manually isolated. 
 Emergency response, including involvement of outside responders, public communication, 
regulatory liaison, and evidence preservation, is crucial during events such as this one. 
 It is extremely important to maintain good relationships between operating plants and 
emergency responders so that if an incident occurs, the response is timely and appropriate. 
 Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) should be aggressive in engaging with 
hazardous materials facilities, using all the resources available to be prepared. 
 
Addressing Hazards at LNG facilities  
 
 Research into historical vapor cloud explosions (VCE) was conducted to help determine if 
such events could be considered credible events at LNG plants.  The investigation used 
forensic evidence from catastrophic VCE events that have occurred around the world.  In 
 
 
each event, the size of the vapor cloud was attributed to an accidental release of small to 
moderate size that continued unmitigated and undetected for a significant time period, 
during atmospheric conditions of low or no wind.  The applicability of these findings to 
LNG plants in the USA will be the focus of a future phase of the work. 
 A study to revise the existing model evaluation protocol (MEP) was presented.  The work 
seeks to correct the data and standardize the max arc-wise concentration methodology used 
for the MEP, eliminate some statistical inconsistencies in the data set, add some new 
features, and provide a new model to data comparison tool for use in future model 
evaluations. 
 A project by Quest Consultants involving risk-based siting, within the scope of small-scale 
facilities, is in progress.  The presentation introduced this concept, explained the 
characteristics of quantitative risk analysis (QRA), and provided some potential directions 
for siting studies in the future.  A review of the QRA option in NFPA 59A’s Chapter 15 
was also provided. 
 A second presentation on risk-based siting was given by DNV-GL.  Their approach would 
evaluate potential exposure, location, process, and technological factors to implement a 
qualitative risk-informed approach to siting.  
 A research project by CH-IV to evaluate the current design spill and single accidental 
leakage source (SALS) selection methodology and the associated vapor dispersion 
modeling was introduced.  The study seeks to identify the typical range of release scenarios 
for a range of LNG plant types, and to evaluate the sensitivities to several variables, as well 
as the impact of common mitigation measures applied to these plants. 
 AcuTech provided background information about process safety management and industry 
best practices introduced in 1992. Process management involves the handling, storing, or 
processing of hazardous chemicals using a structured, risk-based management system. A 
comparative evaluation of the requirements of Part 193 to those found in OSHA’s 29 CFR 
1910.119 was made.  The LNG industry has been most successful in managing safety using 
a combination of conservative industry practices and regulations that exceed most other 
similar industry or regulatory models.  PHMSA intends to continue to explore process 
safety management for LNG facilities.  
 Cameron LNG presented their process safety management program that embraces many 
PSM elements. Cameron is an import facility that has been approved for expansion to an 
export terminal. Complete and accurate written information concerning process chemicals, 
process technology, and process equipment is essential to an effective PSM program and 
to a process hazard analysis (HAZOP) study.  Additionally, Cameron has implemented a 
management of change process and a mechanical integrity program to supplement the 





During the two days of the workshop, there were multiple recurring topics in the discussions and 
the questions proposed by workshop participants. 
 
“Why hasn’t PHMSA adopted a newer version of NFPA 59A?” 
 
 
This question was posed several times during the workshop.  The participants, especially members 
of industry, seemed very concerned that the latest developments incorporated into the NFPA 59A 
standard by its committee were not available for use at LNG plants in the U.S.  Due to the rapidly 
changing industry, LNG plant operators (or those wishing to build one) are increasingly finding 
that the regulations do not adequately address the LNG facilities that companies would like to 
build.  Incorporation of the latest version of NFPA 59A into Part 193 would alleviate some of these 
concerns. 
 
“Does Part 193 address the _____ technology?” 
The evolving LNG industry has seen many technology changes since Part 193 was promulgated, 
and many since the 2001 version of NFPA 59A.  These include, but are not limited to, full 
containment storage tanks, membrane storage tanks, pipe-in-pipe solutions for insulation, new 
liquefaction technologies, modern process controls technology, better hazard detection devices, 
and more efficient equipment.  In addition, the industry has been innovative in how it supplies 
LNG, growing into larger export plants as well as into smaller fueling applications of many 
varieties. 
 
“PHMSA needs to look at risk based siting.” 
There is a perception by the public that risk based siting provides a better safety margin than 
prescriptive requirements. Industry is seeking risk based siting so that they can use active 
mitigation and new technologies to safety site LNG facilities in locations where prescriptive 




Moving forward, PHMSA is evaluating NFPA 59A-2016 for incorporation by reference.  It is also 
addressing issues identified in the 2010 IBR final rule which prevented adoption of the 2006 
edition, as well as the FAQs that have been developed to supplement the current regulations and 
provide guidance for hazards analysis in order to enhance regulatory certainty.  PHMSA is 
considering the information presented at the May workshop, the discussions that occurred there, 
the questions and concerns posed by participants, and comments posted to the docket.  PHMSA is 
reviewing investigation, inspection and enforcement data to identify regulatory gaps and assessing 
siting requirements for new LNG plants. PHMSA is required to perform an alternative analysis to 
determine if there are less burdensome ways to meet the objectives as well as an economic analysis 
to determine whether the benefits of the rule justify its cost. When PHMSA publishes the notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the federal register, there will be an open comment period 
where any interested parties can provide input for PHMSA’s consideration.   
